an political leader was assassinated in Beirut. Mr. Gemayel, the Minister of Industry, was the son of former President Amin Gemayel. Such a development was likely intended to intimidate Lebanon’s Christian community, which has strongly backed Lebanon’s “March 14” movement and has strongly opposed Hezbollah’s quest for greater power.

Nevertheless, even as the clouds of renewed sectarian conflict darken Lebanon’s future, historic experience suggests that any outbreak of significant sectarian war is not likely for at least the next few months. Many such conflicts incubate at a lower level of intensity for months or years before they finally erupt in full fury. In Yugoslavia, nationalistic riots began erupting periodically in 1968. Long periods of calm followed each riot. Civil war did not commence until 1991. In Iraq, low-level violence by Ba’athist elements and Al Qaeda in Iraq continued for months before the current sectarian strife began unfolding in an environment in which central authority and security were largely absent.

Even if Lebanon’s Shia heed Nasrallah’s possible call to engage in mass protests, such protests need not lead to violence, much less civil conflict. The peaceful “Cedar Revolution” that followed the assassination of Hariri and saw

With Hezbollah threatening protests to topple Lebanon’s current government as part of a bid to change the balance of power within the government, Lebanon has been described in news accounts of being in the midst of one of its worst political crises in a generation. A few have even raised the prospect of renewed civil war. Although Lebanon is a country that is at an enhanced risk of sectarian conflict, the odds are against an outbreak of civil war within the next few months or less.

To be sure, Lebanon has many of the characteristics common to states that have experienced such conflict. Its population is mixed in terms of religious affiliation with the existence of two sizable major groups: Muslims (59.7%) and Christians (39%). The Muslim share of the population is increasing. Among the Muslims, 40% are Shia, and that proportion is also growing. These dynamics translate into longer-term pressure for a change in the fundamental sectarian calculation on which Lebanon’s post-civil war government has been organized. On account of the fragile, often uneasy, balance among Lebanon’s sectarian groups, Lebanon’s government is weak. In the recent past, Lebanon experienced a destructive and bloody civil war. The Shia-based Hezbollah group is heavily armed—and more than capable of taking on Lebanon’s relatively weak armed forces—and Shia sections of Lebanon have already suffered significant damage during the recent Israel-Hezbollah fighting, so the Shia have much less to lose in a new civil conflict.

The ongoing political crisis stems from a number of recent developments. First, Hezbollah has been emboldened by what it terms its “Divine Victory” over Israel. Second, its position has been stiffened by the narratives proclaimed by its Iranian and Syrian sponsors. Following the conflict with Israel, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared, “The myth of the invincibility of this contrived and decayed regime [Israel's Government] crumbled thanks to the faith and self-belief of Lebanon's Hezbollah.” Syrian President Bashar Assad predicted, “We tell them [Israelis] that after tasting humiliation in the latest battles, your weapons are not going to protect you - not your planes, or missiles or even your nuclear bombs ... The future generations in the Arab world will find a way to defeat Israel." Third, the establishment of a mixed international-Lebanese tribunal to try those responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri has the potential to implicate Syria, and that has motivated Lebanon’s pro-Syria elements to try to preclude the creation of this court. A change in the Cabinet that grants Shia factions veto power would accomplish that objective. Fourth, in September, anti-Syria leaders in the Lebanese government called for the disarming of Hezbollah consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Fifth, Lebanon is a pawn in a growing geopolitical struggle unfolding in the Middle East between Iran and the United States. With its difficulties in Iraq, the United States is perceived by Iran, Syria, and their allies in Lebanon, as a fading power that increasingly lacks diplomatic and military credibility. Hence, the stage was set for a political confrontation against a Lebanese government that still leans toward the United States and the West.

Recent events in Lebanon suggest that the overall risk of sectarian conflict is now rising. On October 31, 2006, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah demanded that the “March 14 Forces”—Lebanese political leaders who were instrumental in organizing a protest to demand that Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon—agree to a national unity government by November 13. Such a government would mean a change in its current balance of power, a Shia veto over major decisions, and an end to Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s tenure. Furthermore, Nasrallah threatened that if his ultimatum were ignored, “we will work to topple the government and establish an interim government, and then we will call for early parliamentary elections” and vowed “we will [no longer] hold back.” In his call for a “national unity government,” Nasrallah was backed by fellow pro-Syrian leader General Michel Aoun.

On November 8, Iran’s Kayhan newspaper, affiliated with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, opined that Lebanon must grant the Shia the largest representation in its government. In effect, the newspaper called for an abrogation of the framework established at the conclusion of the civil war that formally ended in 1990.

November 13 came and went. Shortly afterward, talks aimed at addressing Nasrallah’s calls proved unsuccessful and six pro-Syria ministers, including all of the Hezbollah representatives, resigned from the Cabinet. On November 19, Nasrallah declared that the talks had failed and pledged that Hezbollah would proceed with its objective of toppling the Lebanese government. On November 20, Nasrallah called the current Lebanese government “illegitimate and unconstitutional.”

A day later, Pierre Gemayel, a prominent anti-Syrian Christian political leader was assassinated in Beirut. Mr. Gemayel, the Minister of Industry, was the son of former President Amin Gemayel. Such a development was likely intended to intimidate Lebanon’s Christian community, which has strongly backed Lebanon’s “March 14” movement and has strongly opposed Hezbollah’s quest for greater power.

Nevertheless, even as the clouds of renewed sectarian conflict darken Lebanon’s future, historic experience suggests that any outbreak of significant sectarian war is not likely for at least the next few months. Many such conflicts incubate at a lower level of intensity for months or years before they finally erupt in full fury. In Yugoslavia, nationalistic riots began erupting periodically in 1968. Long periods of calm followed each riot. Civil war did not commence until 1991. In Iraq, low-level violence by Ba’athist elements and Al Qaeda in Iraq continued for months before the current sectarian strife began unfolding in an environment in which central authority and security were largely absent.

Even if Lebanon’s Shia heed Nasrallah’s possible call to engage in mass protests, such protests need not lead to violence, much less civil conflict. The peaceful “Cedar Revolution” that followed the assassination of Hariri and saw

capable of taking on Lebanon’s relatively weak armed forces—and Shia sections of Lebanon have already suffered significant damage during the recent Israel-Hezbollah fighting, so the Shia have much less to lose in a new civil conflict.

The ongoing political crisis stems from a number of recent developments. First, Hezbollah has been emboldened by what it terms its “Divine Victory” over Israel. Second, its position has been stiffened by the narratives proclaimed by its Iranian and Syrian sponsors. Following the conflict with Israel, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared, “The myth of the invincibility of this contrived and decayed regime [Israel's Government] crumbled thanks to the faith and self-belief of Lebanon's Hezbollah.” Syrian President Bashar Assad predicted, “We tell them [Israelis] that after tasting humiliation in the latest battles, your weapons are not going to protect you - not your planes, or missiles or even your nuclear bombs ... The future generations in the Arab world will find a way to defeat Israel." Third, the establishment of a mixed international-Lebanese tribunal to try those responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri has the potential to implicate Syria, and that has motivated Lebanon’s pro-Syria elements to try to preclude the creation of this court. A change in the Cabinet that grants Shia factions veto power would accomplish that objective. Fourth, in September, anti-Syria leaders in the Lebanese government called for the disarming of Hezbollah consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Fifth, Lebanon is a pawn in a growing geopolitical struggle unfolding in the Middle East between Iran and the United States. With its difficulties in Iraq, the United States is perceived by Iran, Syria, and their allies in Lebanon, as a fading power that increasingly lacks diplomatic and military credibility. Hence, the stage was set for a political confrontation against a Lebanese government that still leans toward the United States and the West.

Recent events in Lebanon suggest that the overall risk of sectarian conflict is now rising. On October 31, 2006, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah demanded that the “March 14 Forces”—Lebanese political leaders who were instrumental in organizing a protest to demand that Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon—agree to a national unity government by November 13. Such a government would mean a change in its current balance of power, a Shia veto over major decisions, and an end to Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s tenure. Furthermore, Nasrallah threatened that if his ultimatum were ignored, “we will work to topple the government and establish an interim government, and then we will call for early parliamentary elections” and vowed “we will [no longer] hold back.” In his call for a “national unity government,” Nasrallah was backed by fellow pro-Syrian leader General Michel Aoun.

On November 8, Iran’s Kayhan newspaper, affiliated with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, opined that Lebanon must grant the Shia the largest representation in its government. In effect, the newspaper called for an abrogation of the framework established at the conclusion of the civil war that formally ended in 1990.

November 13 came and went. Shortly afterward, talks aimed at addressing Nasrallah’s calls proved unsuccessful and six pro-Syria ministers, including all of the Hezbollah representatives, resigned from the Cabinet. On November 19, Nasrallah declared that the talks had failed and pledged that Hezbollah would proceed with its objective of toppling the Lebanese government. On November 20, Nasrallah called the current Lebanese government “illegitimate and unconstitutional.”

A day later, Pierre Gemayel, a prominent anti-Syrian Christian political leader was assassinated in Beirut. Mr. Gemayel, the Minister of Industry, was the son of former President Amin Gemayel. Such a development was likely intended to intimidate Lebanon’s Christian community, which has strongly backed Lebanon’s “March 14” movement and has strongly opposed Hezbollah’s quest for greater power.

Nevertheless, even as the clouds of renewed sectarian conflict darken Lebanon’s future, historic experience suggests that any outbreak of significant sectarian war is not likely for at least the next few months. Many such conflicts incubate at a lower level of intensity for months or years before they finally erupt in full fury. In Yugoslavia, nationalistic riots began erupting periodically in 1968. Long periods of calm followed each riot. Civil war did not commence until 1991. In Iraq, low-level violence by Ba’athist elements and Al Qaeda in Iraq continued for months before the current sectarian strife began unfolding in an environment in which central authority and security were largely absent.

Even if Lebanon’s Shia heed Nasrallah’s possible call to engage in mass protests, such protests need not lead to violence, much less civil conflict. The peaceful “Cedar Revolution” that followed the assassination of Hariri and saw

s pro-Syria elements to try to preclude the creation of this court. A change in the Cabinet that grants Shia factions veto power would accomplish that objective. Fourth, in September, anti-Syria leaders in the Lebanese government called for the disarming of Hezbollah consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Fifth, Lebanon is a pawn in a growing geopolitical struggle unfolding in the Middle East between Iran and the United States. With its difficulties in Iraq, the United States is perceived by Iran, Syria, and their allies in Lebanon, as a fading power that increasingly lacks diplomatic and military credibility. Hence, the stage was set for a political confrontation against a Lebanese government that still leans toward the United States and the West.

Recent events in Lebanon suggest that the overall risk of sectarian conflict is now rising. On October 31, 2006, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah demanded that the “March 14 Forces”—Lebanese political leaders who were instrumental in organizing a protest to demand that Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon—agree to a national unity government by November 13. Such a government would mean a change in its current balance of power, a Shia veto over major decisions, and an end to Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s tenure. Furthermore, Nasrallah threatened that if his ultimatum were ignored, “we will work to topple the government and establish an interim government, and then we will call for early parliamentary elections” and vowed “we will [no longer] hold back.” In his call for a “national unity government,” Nasrallah was backed by fellow pro-Syrian leader General Michel Aoun.

On November 8, Iran’s Kayhan newspaper, affiliated with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, opined that Lebanon must grant the Shia the largest representation in its government. In effect, the newspaper called for an abrogation of the framework established at the conclusion of the civil war that formally ended in 1990.

November 13 came and went. Shortly afterward, talks aimed at addressing Nasrallah’s calls proved unsuccessful and six pro-Syria ministers, including all of the Hezbollah representatives, resigned from the Cabinet. On November 19, Nasrallah declared that the talks had failed and pledged that Hezbollah would proceed with its objective of toppling the Lebanese government. On November 20, Nasrallah called the current Lebanese government “illegitimate and unconstitutional.”

A day later, Pierre Gemayel, a prominent anti-Syrian Christian political leader was assassinated in Beirut. Mr. Gemayel, the Minister of Industry, was the son of former President Amin Gemayel. Such a development was likely intended to intimidate Lebanon’s Christian community, which has strongly backed Lebanon’s “March 14” movement and has strongly opposed Hezbollah’s quest for greater power.

Nevertheless, even as the clouds of renewed sectarian conflict darken Lebanon’s future, historic experience suggests that any outbreak of significant sectarian war is not likely for at least the next few months. Many such conflicts incubate at a lower level of intensity for months or years before they finally erupt in full fury. In Yugoslavia, nationalistic riots began erupting periodically in 1968. Long periods of calm followed each riot. Civil war did not commence until 1991. In Iraq, low-level violence by Ba’athist elements and Al Qaeda in Iraq continued for months before the current sectarian strife began unfolding in an environment in which central authority and security were largely absent.

Even if Lebanon’s Shia heed Nasrallah’s possible call to engage in mass protests, such protests need not lead to violence, much less civil conflict. The peaceful “Cedar Revolution” that followed the assassination of Hariri and saw

Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s tenure. Furthermore, Nasrallah threatened that if his ultimatum were ignored, “we will work to topple the government and establish an interim government, and then we will call for early parliamentary elections” and vowed “we will [no longer] hold back.” In his call for a “national unity government,” Nasrallah was backed by fellow pro-Syrian leader General Michel Aoun.

On November 8, Iran’s Kayhan newspaper, affiliated with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, opined that Lebanon must grant the Shia the largest representation in its government. In effect, the newspaper called for an abrogation of the framework established at the conclusion of the civil war that formally ended in 1990.

November 13 came and went. Shortly afterward, talks aimed at addressing Nasrallah’s calls proved unsuccessful and six pro-Syria ministers, including all of the Hezbollah representatives, resigned from the Cabinet. On November 19, Nasrallah declared that the talks had failed and pledged that Hezbollah would proceed with its objective of toppling the Lebanese government. On November 20, Nasrallah called the current Lebanese government “illegitimate and unconstitutional.”

A day later, Pierre Gemayel, a prominent anti-Syrian Christian political leader was assassinated in Beirut. Mr. Gemayel, the Minister of Industry, was the son of former President Amin Gemayel. Such a development was likely intended to intimidate Lebanon’s Christian community, which has strongly backed Lebanon’s “March 14” movement and has strongly opposed Hezbollah’s quest for greater power.

Nevertheless, even as the clouds of renewed sectarian conflict darken Lebanon’s future, historic experience suggests that any outbreak of significant sectarian war is not likely for at least the next few months. Many such conflicts incubate at a lower level of intensity for months or years before they finally erupt in full fury. In Yugoslavia, nationalistic riots began erupting periodically in 1968. Long periods of calm followed each riot. Civil war did not commence until 1991. In Iraq, low-level violence by Ba’athist elements and Al Qaeda in Iraq continued for months before the current sectarian strife began unfolding in an environment in which central authority and security were largely absent.

Even if Lebanon’s Shia heed Nasrallah’s possible call to engage in mass protests, such protests need not lead to violence, much less civil conflict. The peaceful “Cedar Revolution” that followed the assassination of Hariri and saw

an political leader was assassinated in Beirut. Mr. Gemayel, the Minister of Industry, was the son of former President Amin Gemayel. Such a development was likely intended to intimidate Lebanon’s Christian community, which has strongly backed Lebanon’s “March 14” movement and has strongly opposed Hezbollah’s quest for greater power.

Nevertheless, even as the clouds of renewed sectarian conflict darken Lebanon’s future, historic experience suggests that any outbreak of significant sectarian war is not likely for at least the next few months. Many such conflicts incubate at a lower level of intensity for months or years before they finally erupt in full fury. In Yugoslavia, nationalistic riots began erupting periodically in 1968. Long periods of calm followed each riot. Civil war did not commence until 1991. In Iraq, low-level violence by Ba’athist elements and Al Qaeda in Iraq continued for months before the current sectarian strife began unfolding in an environment in which central authority and security were largely absent.

Even if Lebanon’s Shia heed Nasrallah’s possible call to engage in mass protests, such protests need not lead to violence, much less civil conflict. The peaceful “Cedar Revolution” that followed the assassination of Hariri and saw huge protests by both anti-Syria and pro-Syria elements suggests that Lebanon has some capacity to handle protests. At the same time, Druze political leader, Walid Jumblatt, who has been among the most influential anti-Syria and anti-Hezbollah voices in Lebanon, ruled out counter-protests that could create opportunities for violent clashes.

As a result, the next few months will likely see angry political posturing, renewed negotiations that may be brokered to some extent by Saudi Arabia, Syria and/or Iran, possible protests, and perhaps one or more riots, along with some assassinations. Compromise that would defuse the current political standoff might still be possible. It is not assured that Prime Minister Siniora will retain his post afterward. Agreement to hold early elections is a possibility but not a certainty. A political solution that revamps the current governing arrangement is probably unlikely in the near-term until after the international-Lebanese tribunal is in place. A compromise that falls just short of granting the Shia a veto is possible.

If Lebanon is to experience a fresh civil war within the next few months or sooner, one or more of the following events would likely be the proverbial spark that would ignite the fuse. An assassination of a highly prominent leader such as Hassan Nasrallah, Fouad Siniora, Nabih Beri, Walid Jumblatt, or Sa'ad Hariri, son of Rafiq Hariri and the Majority Leader of Lebanon’s Parliament. One or more attacks on important places of worship or cultural symbols that are revered by Lebanon’s Christian or Shia communities. Those attacks could instigate a self-sustaining and growing cycle of retaliation and revenge. A massacre of Christians or Shia. An effort by a region within Lebanon i.e., Shia-dominated south Lebanon or the predominantly Christian northern part of Lebanon, to secede and form its own independent state. Such an effort could spark conflict as occurred when Yugoslavia began fragmenting in 1991. The heaviest fighting and human toll would be likely to occur in mixed areas in which people from the rival sectarian groups live in close proximity. An economic crisis that forces harsh austerity measures might also precipitate a “zero-sum” competition among Lebanon’s sectarian groups that could grow violent.

Finally, if some of the major dynamics driving the current political standoff do not change or are not resolved, the risks of major sectarian violence could begin to increase from mid-February onward. On February 14, 2005, former Prime Minister Hariri was assassinated. On March 8, 2005 Hezbollah organized a sizable protest backing Syria’s continued de facto occupation of Lebanon. That date coincided with a car bomb attack in a predominantly Shia suburb outside Beirut in 1985 that killed 45 people and wounded 175 others, as they were gathering outside a mosque for Friday prayers. On March 14, 2005 anti-Syria elements staged an even larger protest demanding Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. On April 13, 1975, following an attack on a Maronite church in Ayn ar Rummanaha, a predominantly Christian suburb of Beirut, the spiral of violence that became a full-fledged civil war commenced.

Will Lebanon join Iraq in sectarian conflict? For the next few months, odds suggest that it won’t, but the path ahead could be treacherous. Afterward, the probability could increase, especially in the medium-term and beyond.