ect market organization. Should the content of these beliefs change, so too will the market's structure. But when beliefs adhered to once cannot be acted out in the present, when market structure no longer accommodates them, then the effect of these beliefs on market organization whithers. In time, they will be replaced by alternative beliefs. In the case before us, it is the latter event which takes place. Federal securities laws altered patterns of trading in the market in ways that made it impossible any longer to follow long-held, what I shall call "materialist," beliefs about what makes stock prices change. At the same time they facilitated adoption of "pragmatic" The heart of the market is trading and there’re many principles and dogmas on the basis of which trading is performed. This article will consider the question about the essential ideas of the market participants and their theory of the trading. Market ideologies are essentially beliefs about how we should measure the value of capital. They help traders to determine the relative worthiness of different stocks. They define certain factors as more important than others to consider when figuring out which stocks to buy and which to sell, in what amounts, and at what price. And they provide a theory to explain why and when stock prices vary as they do. The theory, of course, may not be objectively accurate. Stock market participants are not empowered with any special ability to predict the future course of stock prices. Like any other act of fortune-telling, such prediction is (presently) beyond the capacities of the human mind. Except under special circumstances, as we have in the case, say, of insider trading, the act of stock trading is filled with uncertainty. That is why these beliefs are indispensable to the market. Absent any interpretive framework, the fluctuation of stock prices appears to be entirely capricious, an unordered event.

Human beings generally are loath to act in the face of uncertainty, and they avoid doing so unless they possess some collectively defined response that lends a deterministic character to their proceeding, even if the response is mythic. For those in the stock market, the "unreliable" and "mercurial" nature of stock prices "stimulates hard-headed search for firmer ground" which beliefs about why stock prices change evidently provide. The importance of these beliefs for our purposes lies less with the psychological security they bestow than with their effect on market structure. Participants in the market focus their attention on the factors these beliefs identify as important, and they guide their choice of relationships and their activities according to what these beliefs prescribe. These beliefs, in other words, are like an operating code for the market, a code that critically determines the organization of trading, or structure, which we observe in the market. The organization of stock trading, in short, is constituted by market ideologies, by beliefs about stock prices and why they change. The converse of this argument is also true. Market structure must accomodate the prescriptions of a particular operating code before that code can be institutionalized. Here we indicate alternative possibilities by which market structures change.

So far as beliefs can be acted out and are adhered to by market participants, they affect market organization. Should the content of these beliefs change, so too will the market's structure. But when beliefs adhered to once cannot be acted out in the present, when market structure no longer accommodates them, then the effect of these beliefs on market organization whithers. In time, they will be replaced by alternative beliefs. In the case before us, it is the latter event which takes place. Federal securities laws altered patterns of trading in the market in ways that made it impossible any longer to follow long-held, what I shall call "materialist," beliefs about what makes stock prices change. At the same time they facilitated adoption of "pragmatic"

may not be objectively accurate. Stock market participants are not empowered with any special ability to predict the future course of stock prices. Like any other act of fortune-telling, such prediction is (presently) beyond the capacities of the human mind. Except under special circumstances, as we have in the case, say, of insider trading, the act of stock trading is filled with uncertainty. That is why these beliefs are indispensable to the market. Absent any interpretive framework, the fluctuation of stock prices appears to be entirely capricious, an unordered event.

Human beings generally are loath to act in the face of uncertainty, and they avoid doing so unless they possess some collectively defined response that lends a deterministic character to their proceeding, even if the response is mythic. For those in the stock market, the "unreliable" and "mercurial" nature of stock prices "stimulates hard-headed search for firmer ground" which beliefs about why stock prices change evidently provide. The importance of these beliefs for our purposes lies less with the psychological security they bestow than with their effect on market structure. Participants in the market focus their attention on the factors these beliefs identify as important, and they guide their choice of relationships and their activities according to what these beliefs prescribe. These beliefs, in other words, are like an operating code for the market, a code that critically determines the organization of trading, or structure, which we observe in the market. The organization of stock trading, in short, is constituted by market ideologies, by beliefs about stock prices and why they change. The converse of this argument is also true. Market structure must accomodate the prescriptions of a particular operating code before that code can be institutionalized. Here we indicate alternative possibilities by which market structures change.

So far as beliefs can be acted out and are adhered to by market participants, they affect market organization. Should the content of these beliefs change, so too will the market's structure. But when beliefs adhered to once cannot be acted out in the present, when market structure no longer accommodates them, then the effect of these beliefs on market organization whithers. In time, they will be replaced by alternative beliefs. In the case before us, it is the latter event which takes place. Federal securities laws altered patterns of trading in the market in ways that made it impossible any longer to follow long-held, what I shall call "materialist," beliefs about what makes stock prices change. At the same time they facilitated adoption of "pragmatic"

nless they possess some collectively defined response that lends a deterministic character to their proceeding, even if the response is mythic. For those in the stock market, the "unreliable" and "mercurial" nature of stock prices "stimulates hard-headed search for firmer ground" which beliefs about why stock prices change evidently provide. The importance of these beliefs for our purposes lies less with the psychological security they bestow than with their effect on market structure. Participants in the market focus their attention on the factors these beliefs identify as important, and they guide their choice of relationships and their activities according to what these beliefs prescribe. These beliefs, in other words, are like an operating code for the market, a code that critically determines the organization of trading, or structure, which we observe in the market. The organization of stock trading, in short, is constituted by market ideologies, by beliefs about stock prices and why they change. The converse of this argument is also true. Market structure must accomodate the prescriptions of a particular operating code before that code can be institutionalized. Here we indicate alternative possibilities by which market structures change.

So far as beliefs can be acted out and are adhered to by market participants, they affect market organization. Should the content of these beliefs change, so too will the market's structure. But when beliefs adhered to once cannot be acted out in the present, when market structure no longer accommodates them, then the effect of these beliefs on market organization whithers. In time, they will be replaced by alternative beliefs. In the case before us, it is the latter event which takes place. Federal securities laws altered patterns of trading in the market in ways that made it impossible any longer to follow long-held, what I shall call "materialist," beliefs about what makes stock prices change. At the same time they facilitated adoption of "pragmatic"

ese beliefs prescribe. These beliefs, in other words, are like an operating code for the market, a code that critically determines the organization of trading, or structure, which we observe in the market. The organization of stock trading, in short, is constituted by market ideologies, by beliefs about stock prices and why they change. The converse of this argument is also true. Market structure must accomodate the prescriptions of a particular operating code before that code can be institutionalized. Here we indicate alternative possibilities by which market structures change.

So far as beliefs can be acted out and are adhered to by market participants, they affect market organization. Should the content of these beliefs change, so too will the market's structure. But when beliefs adhered to once cannot be acted out in the present, when market structure no longer accommodates them, then the effect of these beliefs on market organization whithers. In time, they will be replaced by alternative beliefs. In the case before us, it is the latter event which takes place. Federal securities laws altered patterns of trading in the market in ways that made it impossible any longer to follow long-held, what I shall call "materialist," beliefs about what makes stock prices change. At the same time they facilitated adoption of "pragmatic"

ect market organization. Should the content of these beliefs change, so too will the market's structure. But when beliefs adhered to once cannot be acted out in the present, when market structure no longer accommodates them, then the effect of these beliefs on market organization whithers. In time, they will be replaced by alternative beliefs. In the case before us, it is the latter event which takes place. Federal securities laws altered patterns of trading in the market in ways that made it impossible any longer to follow long-held, what I shall call "materialist," beliefs about what makes stock prices change. At the same time they facilitated adoption of "pragmatic" beliefs, beliefs which before the 1930s could not compete successfully for recognition within the market, because their prescriptions could not be acted on. It was as a result of this change from "materialist" to "pragmatic" beliefs, a change induced by law, that the organization of stock trading was transformed.